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Creditors' Rights
STATUS OF JUDGMENT CREDITORS UNDER THE RECORDING ACTS
Introduction
Prior to the enactment of the various types of recording stat-
utes, the common law maxim of "prior in time, prior in right"
was the controlling principle regarding conflicting conveyances
from a common grantor. The rationale supporting the rule was
that a grantor could convey only the actual interest possessed;
consequently an attempt to make a subsequent grant of the same
premises was in fact a nullity and ineffective against a prior
grantee. The rigid application of the rule was conducive to fraud
and in order to alleviate the injustice devolving upon innocent
purchasers, recording statutes were enacted. Under modern
statutes priority of interest varies significantly with the wording
of the statutes, which may be classified into three basic types,
namely, (1) race, (2) race-notice, (3) and pure notice.'
At common law judgment creditors were not treated as bona-
fide purchasers and, like subsequent grantees, they could satisfy
their claims only out of the actual interests of their grantee.
2
It is the purpose of this article to survey the effect upon judgment
creditors of those recording statutes which do not expressly make
provision for creditors. A few statutes expressly include credi-
tors,3 but the degree of protection varies with the language of a
I Pure race-first grantee to record has priority; pure notice-subse-
quent grantee, who has not recorded, protected if he does not have notice
of prior conveyance; race-notice-first grantee to record without notice of
prior conveyance has priority. See 4 AmIcAx LAw or PRoPERTY § 17.5 n.63
(Casner ed. 1952) for a classification of the state statutes under the above
three types.
2 Brace v. Duchess of Marlborough, 2 P. Wins. 491, 24 Eng. Rep. 829,830
(1728): "[0)ne cannot call a judgment ... creditor, a purchaser, nor has
such creditor any right to the land; he has neither jus in re nor adrem .... "
24 Eng. Rep. at 830. A judgment creditor does not lend money on the credit
of the land as does the mortgagee.
3 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:22-1 (1940); PA. STAT. Amx. tit. 21, § 351
(Purdon 1955); these statutes limit protection to subsequent judgment
creditors. Compare, ARx. STAT. AN. § 16-115 (1947); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
695.01 (1944), unrecorded conveyance void against creditors; ILL. ANN.
STAr. c. 30, § 29 (Smith-Hurd 1934), all creditors without notice protected.
It is to be noted that this latter group of statutes does not expressly limit
protection to subsequent creditors.
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particular statute and its judicial interpretation.
Resolution of the present question depends upon the answers
to two fundamental questions. First, is a judgment creditor a
member of the class protected by the statute; secondly, if so, is
he subject to the same rules as to priority of legal interest as an
innocent purchaser? The majority of jurisdictions in the United
States do not expressly include creditors within the statutory
language. For convenience these statutes may be placed into two
categories: (1) those which expressly confine protection to bona
fide purchasers,4 and (2) those which purport to protect all third
persons until the instrument of conveyance is recorded.5
Statutes Which Confine Protection To Bona-Fide Purchasers
There are sixteen states which expressly limit the protection
of their respective recording statutes to bona fide purchasers of
a common grantor.6 Clearly the design of such a statute is to pre-
vent the perpetration of fraud upon a subsequent purchaser as
well as to provide an accessible record of title for public inspec-
tion.7 The scope of this type of statute has not been broadened by
judicial interpretation. Since a judgment creditor was not a bona
fide purchaser at common law, he is excluded from the protec-
tion of the recording act by the plain meaning of the statute. Con-
sequently, a judgment creditor is powerless to satisfy his judg-
ment by proceeding against real property which has been con-
veyed prior to judgment. The creditor's sole remedy is against
the actual interest of his debtor and not the interest of record.8
4 CAL. CIV. CODE AN. § 1214 (West 1954); GA. CODE ANN. § 29-401
(1952); IDAHo CODE ANN. § 55-812 (1948); IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-119 (Burns
1951); IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.41 (1950); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 26.547 (1953);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 73-202 (1947); NEV. CoMp. LAWS § 1498 (1929);
N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 291; OHmo REv. CODE ANN. § 5301.25 (Page 1954);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 93.640 (1953); S.D. CODE § 51.1620 (1939); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 57-3-3 (1953); WAsH. REv. CODE § 65.08.070 (1951); Wis. STAT. § 235.49
(1955); Wyo. COMP'. STAT. ANN. § 66-119 (1945).
5 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 118-6-9 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7091 (1949);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 67-223 (1949); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 168 § 14 (1954);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 21 3§ 19, 20, 21 (1951); MAss. AmNN. LAws c. 183 § 4 (1955);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.400 (1949); N.H. REv. LAws c. 477, § 7 (1942); OHmo
REv. CODE ANci. § 5301.23 (Page Supp. 1954), applicable to mortgages only;
R.I GEN. LAws c. 435, § 1 (1938); VT. REv. STAT. § 2648 (1947). Compare
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 15 (1951).
6 See note 4 supra.
7 Jackson v. Post, 12 N.Y. (15 Wend.) *588 (1836): "The object of the
Recording Acts is to prevent frauds-to prevent the person having title to
land from.selling it more than once, and thereby defrauding one or more
purchasers." 12 N.Y. at *594.
8 Lytle v. Black, 107 Ga. 386, 33 S.E. 414 (1899).
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Apparently the fact that he relied upon record ownership in ex-
tending credit is immaterial because the land was not security
for the debt as it would be in the case of a mortgage.9
This principle has been applied in a multitude of situations.
The owner of an unrecorded mortgage given to secure an ante-
cedent debt is afforded priority over a judgment creditor whose
judgment was rendered and docketed prior to the recording of the
mortgage. Since the mortgage was valid between the parties an
equity arose in the mortgagee at the time of execution which
takes precedence over a judgment creditor who possesses no
similar equity in the property.'0 Likewise, the failure to record
a mortgage extension agreement until after a judgment is dock-
eted does not confer any additional rights upon the judgment
creditor."1 Where the creditor attaches the property after it has
been mortgaged by his debtor but before the mortgage is record-
ed, he is subordinated to the rights of the mortgagee, the attach-
ment being, in reality, a nullity. The record owner's title is but a
"mere shell and pretense," as there is no actual interest in the
debtor to which a contingent lien can attach.12
The trustee under an equitable mortgage which was not
capable of being recorded has the right to intervene and enjoin
the sale of property by an execution creditor who relies upon
record ownership in an attempted judicial sale of the property.'3
However, where the sale has been consummated there is a con-
flict as to the trustee's rights. There is substantial authority to
the effect that a purchaser at a judicial sale becomes a bona fide
purchaser within the meaning of the statute.' 4 Justification for
the result is that a judicial sale with all its incidents effects a sub-
stantial change in the situation of the parties analogous to that of
9 See note 2 supra.
30 Sullivan v. Corn Exch. Bank, 154 App. Div. 292, 139 N.Y. Supp. 97
(2d Dep't 1912).
11 Rich v. McCarthy, 198 Misc. 347, 98 N.Y.S.2d 638 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
12 Campbell v. Keys, 130 Mich. 127, 89 N.W. 720 (1902): ".... [W]e do not
see how the attaching creditor obtained any greater interest in the property
levied upon than was then owned by the attachment debtor." 89 N.W. at 722.
13 Frank v. Hicks, 4 Wyo. 502, 25 Pac. 475 (1894); cf. Culp v. Kiene, 101
Kan. 511, 168 Pac. 1097 (1917). Although in the latter case the statute
provided protection for all third parties, it was construed to exclude judg-
ment creditors and execution purchasers.
'4 Sills v. Lawson, 133 Ind. 137, 32 N.E. 875 (1892); Keefe v. Cropper,
196 Iowa 1179, 194 N.W. 305 (1923); Sternberger v. Ragland, 57 Ohio St.
148, 48 N.E. 811 (1897). In the latter case the court was influenced by the'
wording peculiar to the Ohio statute, which provides that "until so recorded
[all conveyances except mortgages are] fradulent, so far as relates to a
subsequent bona fide purchaser... ." See OHno REv. CoDS ANN. § 5301.25
(Page 1954); compare id. § 5301.23.
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a conveyance in satisfaction of or to secure a pre-existing debt.' 5
The result, of course, is in direct conflict with the established
principle that a judgment creditor can proceed only against
the actual interest of his debtor. If the debtor has divested
himself of all actual interest there is logically no interest which
can be levied on and sold at the judicial sale.' 6 Under this view
the purchaser at a judicial sale acquires only derivative rights for
he is merely substituted for the creditor and consequently ac-
quires only the actual right, title, and interest of the debtor.
While the logical consistency of the latter view cannot be assailed,
nevertheless there is much to be said for the former approach.
In its operation it protects those who rely on record title in pur-
chasing; since reliance has been the cause of a monetary detri-
ment, the logic of the latter view should be rejected to protect a
purchaser for value, such protection being the avowed intention
of this type of statute.
It might appear from the foregoing that a judgment creditor is
at the mercy of the ingenious debtor, who can employ devious
methods to insulate his property from the creditor's claims. For-
tunately the law will not give precedence to unrecorded con-
veyances where to do so would be manifestly unjust; likewise
the courts hesitate to give an unrecorded conveyance priority
where there is any taint of fraud. While judgment creditors may
be denied the protection of the recording statute, they are pro-
tected to some extent by fraudulent conveyance statutes. Under
the UNiFoRm FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT any conveyance
which renders or will render the debtor insolvent is fraudulent
as to creditors if given without "fair" consideration. 17 This rule
is applicable without regard to the actual intent of the grantor.
Thus a grantee may be a purchaser for value under the recording
statute, but the conveyance may be set'aside if there is a lack of
"fair" consideration.' 8 Fair consideration also is necessary where
one is engaged or is about to engage in business if the property
15 Sternberger v. Ragland, supra note 14.
16 Stauffacher v. Great Falls Pub. Serv. Co., 99 Mont. 324, 43 P.2d 647
(1935). The fact that the action to recover a judgment is commenced and the
property attached prior to the execution of the deed has no effect on the
prior right of the unrecorded grantee.
17 UxmoRm FRAUDULENT ConvYAwcE ACT § 4. See also § 2 for the
definition of insolvency. The act has been adopted in twenty states.
Is Id. § 3. Fair consideration is that which fairly represents the value of
the property. However, valuable consideration may be much less in
quantum. "It seems to us that it would be a useless waste of time and
energy to cite authorities in support of the proposition that $5 or any other
stated sum of money is a valuable consideration within the meaning of the
law of conveyancing." Strong v. Whybark, 204 Mo. 341, 102 S.W. 968, 969
(1907).
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retained in the business after conveyance is an unreasonably
small capital for the particular enterprise.' 9 Likewise where
one intends or believes he will incur debts beyond his ability to
pay there must be fair consideration.20 However, fair considera-
tion will not prevent the avoidance of a conveyance where there
is an actual intent by the grantor to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors,2 1 but in such a case it has been held that the grantee
knowingly must have participated in the fraud.2
2
Apparently, as to avoiding the conveyance because of fraud
against the creditor, the same result will be reached where the
Uniform Act has not been adopted: a fraudulent intent on the
part of the grantor-debtor is not the controlling factor, and even
where such an intent by the grantor is conceded, the conveyance
will not be set aside unless there is proof that the grantee shared
the fraudulent intent.P The burden of proof is often difficult to
sustain for the mere failure to record is not presumptively frau-
dulent, nor is it evidence of fraud as to the grantee.2 Additional
indicia of fraud from which a fraudulent intent on the part of the
grantee can reasonably be inferred must be shown. Among the
"badges of fraud" are withholding the instrument from the record
for an unreasonable length of time, agreement between the
parties that the grantee will not record,26 intra-family convey-
ances,2 indefinite testimony by the grantee as to the reasons for
not recording, 28 and preferential conveyances in favor of a cer-
tain creditor.2 9 Where the conveyance renders the grantor in-
solvent, there is a presumption of fraud, and the burden of re-
butting the presumption then falls on the grantee3 0
Generally, in order to constitute a fraud upon creditors, it must
19 Id.§5.
20 Id. §6.
21 Id. § 7. Compare 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 96 (a) (b) (1939):
this section provides for the avoidance of preferential conveyances made
by an insolvent within four months prior to the filing of a bankruptcy
petition.
22 See Enos v. Picacho Gold Mining Co., 56 Cal. App. 2d 765, 133 P.2d
663 (1943).
23 Grant v. Cherry, 199 Iowa 164, 201 N.W. 588 (1925); Campbell v.
Remaly, 112 Mich. 214, 70 N.W. 432 (1897). (The Michigan Legislature
adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in 1919.)
24 State Say. Bank v. Buck, 123 Mo. 147, 27 S.W. 341, 342 (1894) (dictum).
25 Hutchinson v. First Nat'l. Bank, 133 Ind. 271, 30 N.E. 952 (1892).
26 Id.
27 Weir v. Baker, 357 Mo. 507, 209 S.W.2d 253 (1948).
28 Ia.
29 Curtis v. Lewis, 74 Conn. 367, 50 Ati. 878 (1902).
30 Weir v. Baker, 357 Mo. 507, 209 S.W.2d 253 (1948).
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appear from the circumstances surrounding the transaction, that
the instrument was withheld from the record by an active con-
cealment for the purpose of giving the grantor a fictitious basis
to secure credit; it is also necessary that that purpose be carried
into effect by inducing creditors to detrimentally change their
position in reliance upon the record title. Unless the creditors
sustain this burden they have no cause to complain against un-
recorded conveyances. 31
A grant that is innocent when executed, however, may become
fraudulent when withheld from the record for the purpose of
concealing the fact that a large portion of the debtor's assets have
been appropriated.32
Lack of consideration also may be indicative of fraudulent
intent, and in several states there are statutes specifically making
such a conveyance void regardless of any actual fraudulent in-
tent, at least as to creditors existing at the time of the convey-
ance.3 3 The typical situation involves a conveyance to a member
of the debtor's family, particularly between husband and wife or
parent and child. However, there is a presumption of considera-
tion, and the burden of rebutting such presumption is upon the
creditor.34
The failure to establish fraud does not exhaust the creditor's
rights against the property where record title is in the debtor.
Independent of fraudulent intent, the grantee's conduct, coupled
with his failure to record, may constitute an estoppel, thus pre-
venting him from asserting his actual ownership against bona fide
creditors. While there is no necessity to prove fraudulent intent,
it is incumbent upon the creditor to show a holding out by the
grantee that the grantor is the actual owner or at least that the
grantee acquiesced in the grantor's conduct. Necessarily, the
grantee must have knowledge that his grantor is using the record
title to induce false credit.3 5 In order to estop the grantee it is
31 Corwine v. Thompson Natl Bank, 105 Fed. 196 (6th Cir. 1900).
'2 Curtis v. Lewis, 74 Conn. 367, 50 Atl. 878 (1902). In this case there was
an attempt to make a preferential conveyance. However, conveyances given
as security or in payment of pre-existing debts are not per se fraudulent.
See Sullivan v. Corn Exch. Bank, 154 App. Div. 292, 139 N.Y. Supp. 97 (2d
Dep't 1912).
33 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 10 (1951). See also Harry v. Hertzler, 185
Okla. 151, 90 P.2d 656 (1939).
34 Bain v. Ullerich, 189 Iowa 149, 177 N.W. 61 (1920). An unrecorded
mortgage is presumed to be given for valid consideration, as under the
negotiable instruments law of the state every negotiable instrument was
deemed prima facie to have been executed for a valuable consideration.
NEGOTIABLE INsmUimNms LAW § 24.
35 Robertson v. Schlotzhauer, 243 Fed. 324 (7th Cir. 1917); the court
applied Indiana law.
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also incumbent upon the creditor to prove detrimental reliance
upon the grantor's apparent ownership. Consequently, where the
debt was created prior to the execution of the conveyance, the
assertion of an estoppel is precluded, as there is no possibility of
detrimental reliance on record title.36
Estoppels have been especially prevalent in cases of intra-
family conveyances. The wife of a debtor has been estopped to
assert her title where she knows or ought to know that creditors
might be dealing with her husband on the basis of his apparent
ownership 3 7 In the "husband to wife" situation, the husband is
sometimes considered an agent acting in behalf of his wife,38 with
the result that any debts incurred by the husband may be satis-
fied out of her actual ownership. However, this theory appears
to be nothing but an awkward manifestation of the fundamental
estoppel doctrine.
Although an agreement not to record the instrument may not
constitute fraud in some situations, it may nevertheless provide
the basis for an estoppel, for ordinarily the purpose of the agree-
ment is to avoid impairment of the grantor's credit.3 9 While there
may be no fraudulent intent, the agreement is certainly con-
ducive to a "holding out," but of course there is always the neces-
sity of detrimental reliance upon apparent ownership 4 0
In addition to the "badges of fraud," other factors which may
raise an estoppel include payment of taxes, and possession and
management of the property by the record owner.4 '
Statutes Which Purport to Protect All Third Parties
Although the wording of a particular statute may vary, the
central theme of this type of statute is that an unrecorded con-
veyance is ineffectual against all third persons, although valid
between the original parties.4 The protection afforded by these
statutes is much more comprehensive than the statutes which
expressly protect only bona fide purchasers. However, the statu-
36 Stark v. Cooper, 203 Mo. App. 238, 217 S.W. 104 (1920).
37 Meltzer v. Shafer, 215 Iowa 785, 244 N.W. 851 (1932); see Corwine v.
Thompson Nat'l Bank, 105 Fed. 196 (6th Cir. 1900).
38 Corwine v. Thompson Nat'l. Bank, supra note 37.
39 See Spitzley v. Garrison, 201 Mich. 363, 167 N.W. 882 (1918); Campbell
v. Remaly, 112 Mich. 214, 70 N.W. 432 (1897).
40 Grant v. Cherry, 199 Iowa 164, 201 N.W. 588 (1925).
41 Meltzer v. Shafer, 215 Iowa 785, 244 N.W. 851 (1932).
42 See note 5 supra. The typical statute of this type reads: "No con-
veyance shall be effectual . . . against any other person but the grantor
and his heirs, unless recorded .... " CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 7091 (1949).
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tory language may be deceptive if considered apart from judicial
construction. Oklahoma's statute purports to protect "third per-
sons," but the Oklahoma Supreme Court has interpreted this to
mean that the only third person within the purview of the act is a
bona fide purchaser.43
Notwithstanding the validity of the conveyance between the
original parties, the comprehensive intent of this type of statute
appears to negative the creation of any interest in the grantee
which would conflict with the rights of third persons against the
grantor. It has been said that the purpose of this legislation was
to settle questions concerning priorities, and to enable all per-
sons extending credit to the grantor to have the benefit of record
ownership without becoming involved in questions of prior
equities.44 Of course the result is very harsh in regard to the
innocent grantee who negligently fails to record. Consequently,
the rule is given a narrow construction in contrast to the liberal
interpretation given to the statutes which protect only bona fide
purchasers. Thus, where a defectively recorded conveyance
would not be binding against a subsequent purchaser, it is never-
theless superior to the ascertained rights of a judgment creditor.45
Since the judgment is afforded the protection of the act, it is
imperative that the basis of priority be considered. Clearly a
mere creditor is not a bona fide purchaser, nor is he an encum-
brancer for value as he does not extend credit with the specific
land as security.4 6 Consequently as a naked creditor he has no
interest in the land even though he may have relied upon owner-
ship as a basis for giving credit. A creditor's right to satisfy his
debt out of the debtors real property arises independently of the
recording acts. Practically speaking he has no enforceable right
until a judgment has been rendered in his behalf. The right
created by the judgment is not in and of itself a right to the
debtor's real property. At common law a judgment did not cre-
ate any lien on the debtor's land: 47 a general lien on real prop-
erty is purely a creature of statutes and its commencement varies
with the applicable statute.48 In some states a general lien on the
43 Oklahoma State Bank v. Burnett, 65 Okla. 74, 162 Pac. 1124 (1917).
Judgment held inferior to unrecorded conveyance prior in time. See also,
Culp v. Kiene, 101 Kan. 511, 168 Pac. 1097 (1917). The Oklahoma statute
reads: ". . . no deed.. . shall be valid as against third persons unless acknowl-
edged and recorded as herein provided." OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 15 (1951).
44 Fosdick v. Barr, 3 Ohio St. *471 (1854). The statute under considera-
tion applied only to mortgages.
45 Tousley v. Tousley, 5 Ohio St. *78 (1855).
46 See note 2 supra.
47 2 FREE Mx, JUDGMNTS § 916 (5th ed. 1925).
48 Id. § 918.
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judgment debtor's real property arises from the first day of the
term at which judgment is rendered,4 9 while in others the judg-
ment must be entered or a transcript filed in the local recorder's
office.5 o
An attachment of the debtor's record property at the com-
mencement of suit will give the creditor priority over a prior
unrecorded grantee presumably because it is in the nature of a
contingent lien intended to isolate the property to insure at least
partial satisfaction of the debt.51
However, the creditor must also be wary of recording acts
relating to judgments. The failure to record an execution judg-
ment prior to the recording by a subsequent grantee shifts the
priority back to the grantee.52 This is the result although recorda-
tion of an execution lien normally relates back to the first step in
acquiring title by execution levy. 3 This result is in accordance
with the spirit of the recording acts by making every title, in so
far as feasible, complete and apparent by a system of comprehen-
sive recordation. On the one hand, creditors are protected from
unrecorded conveyances, while on the other hand the statutes
governing judgment liens place an affirmative duty upon the
creditor to give notice of his rights by entry of the judgment or
attachment.
In general the recording statutes which afford protection to
judgment creditors are notice statutes.54 It is well established
that a judgment creditor forfeits the protection of the recording
act if he has knowledge of a prior unrecorded conveyance. 5
While the decided cases do not expressly rest the creditor's loss
49 E.g., KA=. GEN. STAT. AnN. § 60-3126 (1949).
50 E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 77-1-2 (1953); CONN. G=V. STAT. § 7225
(1949).
5:. Wixon v. Wixon, 76 Colo. 392, 232 Pac. 665 (1925); Aronian v.
Asadoorian, 315 Mass. 274, 52 NE.2d 397, 398 (1943) (dictum). Query: Is the
creditor obliged to attach the property even where the judgment has been
entered and filed? See note 43 supra.
52 Schroeder v. Tomlison, 70 Conn. 348, 39 Atl. 484 (1898). Here A
conveyed to B who neglected to record until after C had been granted an
execution lien against the property. However, C failed to record his lien as
required until after B had recorded the conveyance.
53 Id. at 487.
54 Of the twelve statutes listed at note 5 supra, only the Maryland
statute (race-notice) and the Ohio mortgage statute (pure race) are
excepted. 4 AiMMCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.5 n. 63 (Casner ed. 1952).
55 Goodwin v. Dean, 50 Conn. 517 (1883); Houghton v. Davenport, 74 Me.
590 (1883) (dictum); Hearn v. Purnell, 10 Md. 458, 72 Atl. 906 (1909);
Woodward v. Sartwell, 129 Mass. 210 (1880); Brown v. Manter, 22 N.H.
468 (1851) (dictum); McDuff Estate v. Kost, 158 Atl. 373 (R. I. 1932)
(dictum).
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of priority on the notice provision of the statute, it would seem
to be implicit in the statute that one who has notice of a prior
conveyance - whether he be purchaser or creditor-is to be
denied the benefits of the statute.56 If this is true, then a statute
which provides for pure notice when determining the rights of
purchasers, becomes race-notice in effect when concerned with
priority of judgment creditors. This practical "transition" arises
in this manner: the subsequent purchaser need do nothing at all
to prevail if he has no actual notice of the first conveyance and
if the first purchaser has not recorded. In contradistinction to
that, the judgment creditor will not prevail over a prior un-
recorded conveyance in a pure notice jurisdiction if he does
nothing even though he has no actual notice. Under statutory
structure governing judgments, the judgment creditor must per-
form some affirmative public act in order to establish priority.57
Thus, the race-notice effect is not derived solely from the record-
ing act, but is of a hybrid nature: the notice concept is the result
of the recording statute while the race concept is dependent
upon the statutes peculiar to judgments.
Conclusion
The practical effect of each class of statute on creditors is a
result of the combined policies of the legislature and the courts.
On the one hand, where the statute, on its face, confines its pro-
tection to bona fide purchasers, the courts have uniformly ex-
cluded creditors from the protection of the statute, and reverted
to established common law principles in order to ascertain the
rights of judgment creditors. Assuredly the result is justifiable
for it is quite obvious from the statutory language that only one
class was meant to be protected from unrecorded conveyances. 58
ps E.g., "A conveyance . . . shall not be valid as against any person,
except the grantor... and persons having actual notice of it, unless it ...
is recorded .... " MAss. Aw. LAws c. 183 § 4 (1955).
57 The creditor's affirmative act will constitute constructive notice to the
grantee of the creditor's lien since it sets up a public record. The affirmative
public act may take one of at least five forms: (1) actual recording of the
judgment (2) "entering" of the judgment, (3) filing of a transcript in the
local recording office, (4) attachment and recording thereof, (5) or, if none of
the above are required to be done or are in fact done, the court record of
judgment given, in the county where the property is located.
58 Some states specifically define bona fide purchaser to the exclusion
of creditors, e.g., ". . . and the term 'purchaser' as so used, shall be con-
strued to embrace every person to whom any estate or interest in real estate
shall be conveyed for a valuable consideration .. " WIs. STAT. § 235.50
(1955).
(Vol. XXXII
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To reiterate, a judgment creditor was neither a purchaser at com-
mon law nor did he participate in any form of conveyance. It
might be contended that the statute is too conservative in its
practical effect, but that is within the discretionary province of
the legislature. On the other hand one statute which literally
purports to extend protection to all third parties has been in-
terpreted in an ultra-conservative manner, which seems to delete
a great deal from the obvious intent of the legislature.5 9 By the
liberal language found in the statute itself (third parties) some-
thing more than the bona fide purchaser must have been intend-
ed. Who else but creditors would seek to assert rights against the
record ownership of the grantor? It is submitted that the judicial
interpretation of this statute is in direct conflict with the apparent
intent of the legislature, which must have intended "third person"
to include all third persons and not merely bona fide purchasers
for value.
Similar in apparent legislative intent to this statute are those
which limit the validity of the conveyance to the immediate grant-
or and grantee. These statutes accomplish their intended purpose
by minimizing the possibility of fraud upon interested creditors,
while at the same time forcing compliance with the recording
laws pertaining to judgment creditors. The policy of the legisla-
ture is by no means conservative, and judicial interpretation has,
generally, been consonant with the liberal policy of protecting
those who are farsighted enough to give notice of their rights.
To deny protection to those who fail to avail themselves of the
recording system is not to deny justice, for all are given equal
opportunity to secure protection. Thus, under this type of statute
the courts are implementing the over-all policy of the recording
system -that all titles be complete and apparent on the record,
with all persons being equally and adequately protected in their
rights by compliance with the letter and spirit of the recording
system.
John G. Curran
59 See note 41 supra.
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